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Abstract 
 
*Laffiteau, Charles A. “The WTO Appellate Body’s Shrimp-Turtles Decision: A 
Great Leap Forward in the Protection of the Global Environment?” This paper 
explores the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an institution of global governance, 
by analyzing the WTO Appellate Body‘s decision upholding an arbitration panel‘s 
ruling against the United States‘ (US) in the Shrimp-Turtles trade dispute. Rather than 
a setback for environmental protection, I argue this Appellate Body ruling charted a 
new course for future arbitration panels in making determinations regarding the 
legality of trade related environmental restrictions. Among other things, the decision 
opened the door for unsolicited environmental NGO legal filings and in fact upheld 
the US‘s right to ban shrimp and shrimp products from producers who used fishing 
methods that endangered sea turtles. This paper also identifies the modifications to 
principles of international law which came about as a result of this landmark WTO 
legal ruling. All of these modifications can be seen as advantageous for nations and 
environmental NGOs seeking to protect certain areas of their national and global 
environment or endangered species. The disadvantages of this decision in the view of  
less developed countries is also detailed prior to the conclusions section, which offers 
some suggestions as regards how nations can use trade related restrictions to foster 
improved compliance with environmental regulations.  
*With acknowledgements to Ms Maria McDonald of the Dublin City University 
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Was the WTO Appellate Body‘s October 12th 1998 Shrimp-Turtles decision: a 
great leap forward in the protection of the global environment? In contrast to the 
condemnation the WTO received from environmental NGOs, I contend that this 
ruling opened the door for NGOs filings and upheld the United States (US) right to 
ban shrimp and shrimp products from producers who did not use acceptable fishing 
methods to safeguard endangered sea turtles. The Appellate Body only upheld the 
arbitral panels ruling against the US, because the US had applied different standards 
to Caribbean producers than it applied to Asian shrimp importers. This essay 
identifies analyses and discusses the modifications to principles of public international 
law that were made by the WTO as a result of this decision. These modifications may 
be seen as advantageous for nations and (NGOs) seeking to protect the environment 
and endangered species. The disadvantages of this decision in the view of many less 
developed countries, as well as some suggestions for going forward, are also detailed. 
Background 
The issues surrounding the need to protect our global environment have only 
recently come to light over the last fifty years, dating to the 1962 publication of 
biologist Rachel Carson‘s groundbreaking book, Silent Spring1, which detailed the 
global environmental effects of the use of a pesticide known as DDT. Now problems 
with the environment could no longer be avoided. As Antonio Cassese notes; 
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―Before, the problem was not felt, for three main reasons. First, 
industrial developments had not spawned pollution and damage 
to the environment on a very large scale. Second, States still took 
a traditional approach to their international dealings: they looked 
upon them as relations between sovereign entities, each pursuing 
its self-interest.….and unmindful of general or community 
amenities. Third, public opinion was not yet sensitive to the 
potential dangers of industrial and military developments to a 
healthy (global) environment.‖2 
 
Public awareness of environmental issues and our sensitivity regarding how 
they impact all nation states civil societies has risen dramatically since the 1960s. 
Environmental issues can have profound impacts on national and international 
political economy. While states officials are also aware of the problems caused by 
environmental degradation and abuse, they are often reluctant to take the steps needed 
to curb such abuses for fear of offending various business interests. The costs to 
business interests and multinational corporations (MNCs) of addressing the pollution 
problems they cause and or of adhering to new environmental regulations, are often 
seen as onerous with negative impacts on their current and future profitability. Many 
MNCs have moved their operations to other countries with lax environmental rules in 
an effort to avoid paying for these costs. ―Likewise as governments and consumers in 
the (wealthier nations of the) North have restricted or banned a number of tobacco 
products, pharmaceuticals and pesticides, global marketing (by MNCs) has created 
new outlets for these goods in the (developing countries of the) South and East.‖3 To 
further illustrate this point; ―Nearly a third of pesticides exported from the North have 
been outlawed, unregistered or withdrawn in the country of manufacture.‖4 
The reluctance of states to take action with respect to environmental issues 
(combined with the forces of globalisation that fuel these concerns) has led to the 
formation of numerous environmental NGOs, which lobby voters and officials in 
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nation states, in addition to petitioning judicial courts and international institutions, 
around the world to implement policies that are environmentally sensitive. These 
NGOs have been moderately successful to date, in terms of raising global awareness 
and generating international agreements to deal with certain issues such as ozone 
depletion. As Scholte pointed out; ―we have developed some potentials for global 
governance of environmental matters. In this respect the ozone regime established 
through the 1985 Vienna Convention and the 1987 Montreal Protocol has proved 
particularly successful.‖5 The success of international agreements to reduce 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) shows what can be done when states become alarmed 
enough to take action on a global scale. For example; ―in 1997 world production of 
most ozone-depleting substances had fallen to 76 percent of the 1988 level.‖6  
Unfortunately, progress in other areas, such as cutting the greenhouse gas 
emissions which lead to global warming, has been slow to non-existent in many 
countries. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol aimed at cutting greenhouse gas emissions world 
wide, did not come into effect until 2005 because of the difficulty in getting enough 
states, which in total produced more than 50 percent of these gases, to ratify the 
agreement. In the interim, the United States (US), which is the largest producer of 
such greenhouse gases, has decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and China, which 
is the 2nd largest and fastest growing producer of carbon based emissions, has refused 
to take any steps to address its obligations under the treaty. BBC science analyst 
Tracey Logan notes that many experts believe that Kyoto will be largely ineffective as 
the world's two biggest emitters, the US and China, will not cut their outputs.
7
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Nonetheless, the Kyoto Protocol was and is a positive step in the right 
direction. This environmental treaty has led to other steps by the European Union 
(EU) and Canada to implement greenhouse gas trading schemes which will 
complement those spelled out in the international treaty. The Kyoto Protocol was the 
most ambitious attempt yet, to address a major environmental issue on a global scale. 
But as is so often the case with large agreements involving many different countries 
with competing agendas, Kyoto required significant political compromises on the part 
of nations in both the developed world and developing countries. ―Whereas the Kyoto 
example suggests that liberal environmentalism enables international environmental 
agreements that otherwise might have been more difficult to achieve, the irony may 
be that the kind of agreement created may be vastly inadequate to significantly 
forestall, let alone stop or reverse, current trends in greenhouse gas emissions.‖8 In 
other words, is the Kyoto Protocol just another example of an international agreement 
which amounts to nothing more than ‗too little, too late‘?   
There are significant differences between an international community reaching 
agreements on ozone depleting substances and making similar agreements covering 
greenhouse gases and other environmental concerns. Regarding the ozone protocol; 
 ―The successive negotiations and protocols of the 1970s and 
1980s enabled a common international framework for 
negotiations to emerge, and aided the establishment of a 
scientific consensus in the face of uncertainty. On the basis of 
this it proved politically possible to transform the production and 
consumption of CFCs, first in the West (North), and then, 
through new financial mechanisms, in the South. However, the 
speed of negotiations, when measured against the pace of 
environmental degradation, looks alarmingly sluggish and the 
simplicity of the politics of ozone depletion (few producers, 
possible [economical] substitutes, many non-essential uses) is 
unlikely to be replicated in other environmental contexts.‖9  
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The political complexity of the problem involving greenhouse gases (many 
producers, few economical substitutes, and many essential uses) is such that it is hard 
to imagine any international agreement on this issue will be as successful as the 
agreement on ozone depletion.  
The reality of the international situation surrounding climate change is that 
progress has been almost non-existent. ―Half a dozen United Nations (UN) 
conferences through the 1990s on climate change have yielded limited concrete 
results. Nor has general backing yet developed for a World Environment Organization 
(WEO) that would work on a par with the WTO and other global governance 
organizations.‖10  The ―Earth Summit‖ convened by the UN General Assembly and 
commonly referred to as the 1992 Rio Conference, was widely viewed as a success 
for those concerned about the environment, but in reality only established a 
―framework‖ for future negotiations on the environment among member states of the 
United Nations.  
―Non-governmental organizations had their own parallel 
conference in Rio, but (for the first time) were also entitled to 
attend the intergovernmental meetings. The Rio Declaration (27 
general principles to guide action on environment and 
development), Article 21 (promoting sustainable development), 
and the Declaration of Forest Principles were all agreed, and the 
conventions on climate change and biodiversity were 
respectively signed by 154 and 150 governments. The 
Convention on Desertification was not ready in time and was not 
agreed to until June 1994.‖11  
 
Environmental NGOs came away from the 1992 Rio Conference with an 
enhanced international stature which they began using as leverage to push individual 
nation states to both ratify the Declaration and the Rio conventions as well as begin 
implementing new environmental reforms and regulations. The more developed 
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Western countries in Europe and North America, also known as ―states in advanced 
capitalist societies‖ (SIACS) were particularly sensitive to this pressure from the 
NGOs, many of which were founded and based in their countries. ―Among SIACS the 
unpalatable implications of many environmental policies for key groups of producers 
and consumers, and the enmeshment of problematic environmental practice with the 
basic routines of everyday life, are such that few governments, if any, have shown 
themselves willing to accept the political costs of policies – coercive or catalytic – 
which might bring economic and social practices into line with the requirements of 
global environmental sustainability.‖12 In other words, persuading individual nations 
to adopt environmental reforms is as slow and tedious a process as it is getting nations 
to agree to international accords governing environmental practices.      
Many scholars and environmental groups, as well as governments on opposite 
sides of environment and trade issues, are displeased with the way in which the WTO 
currently deals with environmental issues and their impact on world trade disputes. 
Sabrina Shaw and Risa Schwartz write that;  
―The relationship between trade and environment in the World 
Trade Organization, according to some, is being created through 
disputes because of the lack of recommendations from the 
(WTO) Committee on Trade and Environment on trade and 
environment issues and because of the delay in launching a new 
round of trade negotiations.‖13  
 
Many multi-national corporations (MNCs) and developing countries want the 
WTO to either confine itself strictly to trade disputes or to negotiate any linkages 
between environmental issues and trade, within the framework of broader trade 
negotiations and concessions by developed countries in areas of concern to 
developing countries. On the other hand, environmental NGOs and states in advanced 
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capitalist societies (SIACS) want the WTO to allow them to use trade sanctions to 
force other states to comply with regulations designed to protect the environment and 
endangered plant and animal species (without waiting for another round of trade 
negotiations and or concessions). 
For its part, the WTO has tried to steer a middle course in between these 
opposing positions, in part because it recognizes that both sides have valid arguments. 
The WTO also wants to maintain existing trade agreements between the SAICS and 
the developing countries of the world, while it conducts negotiations to expand these 
agreements and facilitate trade in goods and services worldwide. Environmental 
issues were a ―fly in the ointment‖ that the WTO would rather see handled by some 
other International body. This desire of the WTO to focus primarily on reducing trade 
restrictions and tariffs is perhaps one of the reasons why the WTO Committee on 
Trade and Environment has yet to make any recommendations to the governing body. 
Case Analysis 
In the successor agreement to GATT, the WTO Preamble added three new 
elements; ―expanding production in trade and services (as well as goods), seeking 
sustainable development by protecting and preserving the environment, and 
recognizing the need for positive efforts to distribute the benefits of economic 
development to all developing countries.‖14 In addition to the WTO Preamble, article 
XX (g) is also extremely important because it is the section that allows for measures 
that deviate from GATT and WTO rules for the purpose of environmental protection. 
Peter van den Bossche explains how Article XX(g) is applied writing that; 
―Article XX(g) sets out a three-tier test requiring that a measure; 
• relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
• relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources; and 
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• be made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption.‖15 
 
 Peter van den Bossche also notes that trade related measures under article 
XX(g) must not discriminate by noting its anti-discrimination caveat; ―For a measure 
to be justified under Article XX, the application of that measure, pursuant to the 
chapeau of Article XX, should not constitute ‗arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail‘.‖16 However, despite the WTO 
Preamble‘s provision for sustainable development by protecting and preserving the 
environment, previous rulings by WTO panels in similar Tuna-Dolphin cases 
involving the US, neatly side stepped environmental concerns. Joel Trachtman notes; 
―Both the 1991 and the 1994 panels had found that the U.S. 
measure, as a regulation of a process rather than a product, was 
not exclusively covered by art. III of GATT, and so was subject 
to the prohibition of embargoes under art. XI. The 1991 panel 
found that the U.S. measures did not qualify for an exemption 
under art. XX because that provision did not permit the 
protection of animals outside the territory of the state adopting 
the relevant measure.‖17  
 
The WTO panel used the same reasoning used by the two prior Tuna-Dolphin 
case arbitration panels [i.e. that article XX(g) didn‘t allow the US to protect sea turtles 
outside of its territorial boundaries] in making its decision in the United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case, once again side 
stepping the environmental issues raised by the US in defence of its position. All three 
panels rejected briefs file by NGOs in these cases because it had not asked these 
NGOs to submit them. All three previous arbitration panels also denied US claims of 
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justification for these embargoes under Article XX on the grounds that permitting 
such bans undermined the trading system it was trying to protect and maintain. But in 
the Shrimp-Turtles case the arbitration panel specifically addressed the US claims 
under Article XX by stating that, ―While the WTO Preamble confirms that 
environmental considerations are important for the interpretation of the WTO 
Agreement, the central focus of that agreement remains the promotion of economic 
development through trade; and the provisions of GATT are essentially turned toward 
liberalization of access to markets on a non-discriminatory basis.‖18 
In the case of United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Products, the WTO Appellate Body, subsequently rejected a number of the 
arbitration panels‘ findings as well as the reasoning the panel used in making its 
determinations. The breadth of the Appellate Body‘s rejection of the panel‘s 
reasoning for its rulings made this a historic case in terms of opening up new areas of 
international trade law to the consideration of the environmental concerns of trading 
partners. The Appellate Body also accorded international legal standing to NGOs for 
the first time, opening the door for future arbitration panels to consider NGO briefs 
filed in conjunction with international trade disputes, irregardless of whether or not 
the arbitration panel had asked for their opinions in such cases.  
Public international law often involves conflicting norms and principles and 
the WTO is the key player in an important area of globalisation and public 
international law. The WTO acts as a vital mechanism for advancing globalisation in 
the economic sphere, because it makes the rules which govern trade and commerce 
between nations around the world. International trade in goods and services is the 
                                                 
18 WTO Panel Report, United States--Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/R 
(98-1710), 15 May 1998 paragraph 7.42 
 
 10 
engine of globalisation, which is fuelled by increasing international capital flows and 
technological advances in communications and computers. Joost Pauwelyn notes; 
―That WTO rules are legally binding rules part of international 
law must, indeed, stand beyond doubt. They derive from a treaty 
and, pursuant to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties, ‗every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it 
and must be performed by them in good faith‘ (that is, the pacta 
sunt servanda principle).‖19  
  
In this way, the WTO functions as a type of global governance mechanism in 
an important branch of public international law. Nations must abide by WTO rules, 
regardless of what their own internal domestic politics or policies may be, or suffer 
the consequences from an economic standpoint. 
The fact that the WTO Appellate Body considered the legal briefs filed by 
environmental NGOs and chastised the arbitration panel for not doing so in United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, underscores the 
growing influence of NGOs on international institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WTO. The NGO are not party to the proceeding and 
―although not influencing the policies of these bodies much, yet [the WTO is] 
broadening their agendas to include social (human, labour, environmental rights etc,) 
issues more regularly, this increasingly institutionalized participation by NGOs 
undermines the nation state‘s claim to be the sole legitimate representative of the 
public interest in its country. Many developing countries, and especially weaker 
nations in the southern hemisphere, oppose such widening consultation and 
representation to unelected NGOs on these grounds. But these examples of global 
governance may be considered a further indication of the operation of globalization at 
the political level, and (one) which incorporates increasingly growing numbers of 
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international social groups (non-state actors) in key multilateral institutions. 
‖20However, it is worth noting that the WTO is required in its Preample and its 
articles to have regard to human, labour, environmental rights. More importantly, the 
WTO is not above international law and therefore in making any decisions, they must 
take account of norms of international law relating to these issues whether they 
involve developing or developing countries.  
Many scholars agree with developing countries, in so far as this broadening of 
the mandates of international institutions like the IMF and WTO to include a wide 
range of social issues is, in fact, moving beyond the intended purpose(s) which were 
initially used to justify the creation of these institutions. Arguments as regards these 
international institutions ―creeping‖ acquisition of control over other areas of 
international governance, at the expense of individual nation states authority in such 
matters, are not without merit. Given the fact that genocide and other breaches of 
grave human rights can be prosecuted universally by individual sates or by the 
International Criminal Court, there is some justification for doing so with respect to 
environmental issues, since these are sometimes linked with human and or labour 
rights violations and concerns. While human and labour rights abuses are no more 
justifiable than environmental abuses, they have fairly limited impacts on other nation 
states civil societies. Their impacts are generally confined to the nation states and civil 
societies where they are occurring and are rarely felt beyond the states and regions 
near its borders. On the other hand, environmental issues have much broader impacts 
on other nation states and sometimes result in global repercussions. The effects of 
ozone depletion, air and water contamination, deforestation and species extinctions 
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are felt globally as well as within the nation states and regions where such 
environmental abuses are occurring.  
Because of the difficulty in achieving and implementing national policies and 
international environmental agreements in a timely manner (during the years 
following the 1992 Rio conference), environmental NGOs have come to the 
conclusion that the fastest way to address their environmental concerns is through 
existing international agreements and public international law. International trade 
agreements under the auspices of the WTO are one of the avenues that NGOs would 
like to pursue because of the economic consequences countries are likely to suffer 
should they decide to ignore WTO decisions. The difficulty for NGOs in pursuing this 
course of action has been persuading the WTO to agree to link environmental issues 
with trade disputes pursuant to Article XX (g), which permits states to embargo goods 
―as a measure related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.‖21 Prior to 
the WTO Appellate Body‘s ruling in United States—Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, (aka Shrimp-Turtles dispute) WTO arbitration panels 
had refused to recognize such measures as permissible under the Article XX(g) by 
stating that ―they were unjustifiable under the ‗chapeau‘ of Article XX.‖22 NGOs had 
also been stymied by previous arbitration panels‘ refusal to accept their ―third party‖ 
briefs and filings in trade disputes involving environmental issues. 
The WTO Appellate Body‘s decision in the Shrimp-Turtles dispute 
represented a significant departure from the WTO‘s previous use of ―traditional law‖ 
in deciding trade disputes involving environmental issues. Given the fact that WTO 
decisions are integral to public international law, this WTO Appellate Body decision 
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represented a modification to certain traditional law principles of public international 
law. Antonio Cassese writes that;  
―Significant evidence of this traditional stand can be found in 
two cases brought before international courts before the late 
1950s: the Pacific Fur Seal case (1893) and the Trail Smelter 
case (1938 and 1941. The former concerned a dispute between 
the USA and Britain over some issues relating to jurisdiction in 
the Behring Sea and – what is more relevant to our subject – the 
question whether the USA had a right of property and protection 
of fur seals outside of its three-mile territorial waters. The latter 
case concerned relations between two industrialized States, the 
USA and Canada. The USA accused Canada of damaging, 
through the industrial activities of a factory situated on its 
territory, the environment of the American State of 
Washington,‖23  
 
International court rulings in these cases upheld certain principles of 
traditional law and helped provide a precedent under public international law. In the 
Pacific Fur Seal case ―the Arbitral Court upheld the British view, holding that the 
USA had no ‗right of protection or property in the fur-seals‘. It thus implicitly 
dismissed, among other things, the concept of ‗trust for the benefit of mankind‘.‖24 
However in the Trail Smelter case the Arbitral Court held that ―every State has a duty 
at all times to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals within its 
jurisdiction….under the principles of international law….Consequently the Court held 
Canada responsible for the conduct of the Trail Smelter and enjoined it to pay 
damages to the USA.‖25 Both of these decisions were made within the framework of 
traditional public international law and were guided by the accepted principles of law 
governing state to state relations. It wasn‘t until a later ruling in 1957, that an 
international court first recognized the need to address the ‗common interests of 
everybody‘. ―Thus, in the Lac Lanoux case (1957) the Arbitral Tribunal, while (still) 
taking a traditional view of international law regulating relations between 
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neighbouring States, alluded to the possibility of natural resources such as the water 
of a lake being exploited ‗in the common interests of everybody‘.‖26 
Thus far, according to Cassese only five general principles concerning the role 
of environmental protection have evolved under public international law.  
―The first (first set out in the Trial Smelter case) and more 
general one is that enjoining every State not to allow its territory 
to be used in such a way as to damage the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Another (second) general principle is that imposing upon States 
the obligation to co-operate for the protection of the 
environment. A (third) less vague principle is that requiring 
every State to immediately notify other States of the possible risk 
that their environment may be damaged or affected by an 
accident that has occurred on its territory or in an area under its 
jurisdiction. Another (fourth) general principle is that enjoining 
States to refrain from causing massive pollution of the 
atmosphere or the seas. The last of these five principles doesn‘t 
have as broad of an impact as the previous four, but is important 
nonetheless. This (fifth principle) was spelled out in a decision 
by the Rotterdam Tribunal in 1983 that read ‗the upstream users 
of an international river are no longer entitled to the unrestricted 
use of (the waters) of such a river, and are bound, when taking 
decisions concerning its use, to take reasonable account of the 
interests of other users in downstream areas.‘‖27 
 
In recent years it has been decisions by the WTO Appellate Body, rather than 
WTO arbitration panels, which have opened the door to consideration of demands by 
NGOs and other sympathetic nation states that, in some cases, environmental 
concerns were legitimate justifications for trade restrictions imposed by states on 
trading partners. In an earlier ruling in 1996, the WTO Appellate Body had upheld the 
US government‘s right to apply US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
standards for cleaner burning fuels to imported gasoline products from Venezuela, so 
long as these regulations were not applied in a discriminatory manner. While the US 
lost this case because the EPA rules for re-formulated gasoline were clearly 
favourable to US domestic refineries, a precedent was set nonetheless, legitimizing 
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the rights of nations to force their trading partners to adhere to their environmental 
regulations (so long as their were applied in a non-discriminatory fashion).  
In the Shrimp–Turtles dispute, the WTO Appellate Body went even further in 
its decision to overturn portions of the arbitration panels ruling against the US. The 
arbitration panel in the Shrimp–Turtles dispute interpreted Article XX in the same 
way previous panels in Tuna-Dolphin cases had. ―By selecting a limited ―object and 
purpose,‖ the Panel predetermined that measures having an environmental object and 
purpose could not be justified under art. XX. The Panel concluded that derogations 
from other provisions of GATT are permissible under art. XX only so long as they ‗do 
not undermine the multilateral trading system.‘‖28 The WTO Appellate Body firmly 
rejected this line of reasoning and in so doing effectively rejected the reasoning used 
in the previous Tuna-Dolphin cases as well. The Appellate Body rejected the panel‘s 
decision to interpret the chapeau of Article XX so narrowly that it was effectively 
rendered useless by virtue of the panel‘s decision that the US import ban was ―not 
within the scope of measures permitted under the chapeau of Article XX.‖29 The 
Appellate Body interpreted and viewed the chapeau of Article XX in a completely 
different context than the panel, by ―finding that it is intended to prevent abuse of the 
exceptions listed in art. XX,‖30 The Shrimp-Turtle panel (as had previous arbitration 
panels) had interpreted the chapeau from a much different perspective, reasoning that 
it was meant to severely limit the use of Article XX‘s exceptions. 
Trachtman also points out that;  
―The Appellate Body further criticized the panel for examining 
compliance with the chapeau prior to determining compliance 
with any of the following exceptions.  It is not possible to 
determine whether an exception is being abused without first 
determining whether the exception is otherwise available  In fact, 
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the Appellate Body completely rejected the panel‘s line of 
reasoning (stating that:  ―conditioning access to a Member's 
domestic market on whether exporting Members comply with, or 
adopt, a policy or policies unilaterally prescribed by the 
importing Member may, to some degree, be a common aspect of 
measures falling within the scope of one or another of the 
exceptions (a) to (j) of Article XX.‖31  
 
With these rulings the WTO Appellate Body significantly modified existing 
international trade law (as well as the  public international law it is a part of) by 
establishing a new interpretation of Article XX for the purpose of guiding future 
arbitration panels‘ reasoning in trade disputes involving environmental issues.  
The WTO Appellate Body not only validated the use of Article XX‘s (a) to (j) 
exceptions to justify individual nation state trade restrictions based on environmental 
considerations, but it also broadened the definition of ―exhaustible natural resources‖ 
which could be protected by environmental regulations and restrictions. Gregory 
Shafer notes this distinction writing that; 
―Rather than analyze the original intent or drafting history of 
Article XX, the Appellate Body affirmed that the term 
‗exhaustible natural resources‘ is not static in its context or 
reference, but is rather by definition, evolutionary….that it must 
be read….in the light of contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations about the protection and conservation of 
the environment. The Appellate Body stated that ‗it is too late in 
the day‘ to limit coverage under Article XX (g) to ‗the 
conservation of exhaustible mineral or non-living 
resources‘….(and) ‗in the absence up to now of any agreed 
amendments or modifications to the substantive provisions of 
GATT 1994‘ the Appellate Body amended prior GATT analysis 
in light of contemporary perspectives.‖32  
 
Therefore, based on this legally binding interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 
living animal and marine species could henceforth be regarded as an ‗exhaustible 
natural resource‘ within the exceptions permissible under Art. XX.  
 
                                                 
31 Trachtman: 192-194 
32 Shafer : 511 
 
 17 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Many of the environmental activists and NGOs who were highly critical of 
this WTO decision, ―couldn‘t see the forest for the trees‖, because they focused on the 
fact that the panels ruling against the US was essentially upheld by the Appellate 
Body. But a careful analysis of the elements of the panels decision which were 
overturned and or reversed by the Appellate Body, leads to a far different conclusion. 
For the first time living animal and marine species were defined under international 
trade law (and thus public international law) as an ―exhaustible natural resource‖ 
subject to (extraterritorial) conservation measures undertaken by states outside their 
respective territorial waters and boundaries. Earlier rulings by the Appellate Body in 
the US-Venezuela gasoline case had added ‗clean air‘ to the list of ―exhaustible 
natural resources‖ covered by the exceptions permitted under Article XX. This was an 
extremely significant modification to existing public international and trade law. 
Furthermore, environmental NGOs were even bigger winners in the United 
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case, because of 
the Appellate Body‘s decision to set another precedent and welcome unsolicited (by 
the WTO arbitration panels) future briefs and filings on their behalf. Indeed the first 
action taken by the Appellate Body in this case ―overruled the panels holding that 
‗accepting non-requested information from non-governmental sources is incompatible 
with the provisions of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). In the appeal, the 
Appellate Body not only accepted ‗for consideration‘ three NGO briefs attached as 
exhibits to the US submission; it also accepted a revised version of one of these briefs 
independently submitted by a group of NGOs.‖33 While the Appellate Body did not 
go so far as to define procedures for the filings of such ―amicus‖ (or friend of the 
                                                 
33
 Shafer : 509-510 
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court, third party) briefs, by accepting them, it nonetheless went beyond the language 
used in Article 13 of the DSU which ―refers to a panels ‘right to seek information’, 
and the panel clearly did not ‗seek’ ―non-requested information.‖34  
It would also appear that the Appellate Body may have not only opened the 
door for NGOs to file such briefs, but, in so doing, may have provided other non-state 
actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), supraterritorial institutions like the 
European Union (EU) and international institutions such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) an avenue for un-solicited amicus filings as well. 
These other non-state actors (principally MNCs) may have a vested interest in 
particular trade disputes brought before the WTO and may wish to influence future 
arbitration panel decisions thru the use of their own business, trade and financial data 
as well as their own legal arguments. Wealthy and powerful MNCs can afford to 
assemble vast amounts of information and high powered legal teams to press their 
arguments much more readily than non-profit environmental (human and labour 
rights) NGOs are able to.       
As for the developing countries who were the complainants in the Shrimp-
Turtles case, they might ―win this battle, but (in the process) lose the war‖35. Lax 
environmental standards are often viewed as one of the few comparative advantages 
producers in these countries possess. They often can‘t afford to implement the 
technologies required to address environmental strictures being imposed on their 
means of production by other nations. As I alluded to earlier, ―Many developing 
countries, and especially weaker nations in the southern hemisphere, oppose such 
widening consultation and representation to unelected NGOs on these grounds.‖36 
They would prefer to address environmental issues within the framework of broader 
                                                 
34 Shafer : 510 
35 Roilo Golez. Member House of Representatives from Paranaque City, Phillipines 2nd District, 1988 
36 King and Kendall: 171 
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trade negotiations with (and other trade concessions by) more developed countries. 
Previous WTO arbitration panel rulings had generally been favourable to the interests 
of the developing countries. These arbitration panels rather technical interpretations of 
environmental exceptions allowed under Article XX , coupled with the panels narrow 
definitions of terms like ―exhaustible natural resources‖ (as applying only to non-
living resources) were viewed favourably by developing countries. The decision by 
the WTO Appellate Body to reject previous interpretations of allowable exceptions, 
broaden the definition of ―exhaustible natural resources and to allow NGOs un-
solicited amicus briefs to become a part of WTO dispute settlement proceedings has 
been construed as disadvantageous to the interests of developing countries and is very 
worrisome to them. 
While the influence of NGOs is growing around the world in many nation 
states and within international institutions like the WTO, many scholars question just 
how much of an impact they can really have given the realities of an increasingly 
globalized market place. One such view is that ―there are limits to the degree of 
support and acceptance their agendas are likely to secure…. the power of the free 
market ideal remains strong.‖ 37 Another suggestion that has been made to address 
environmental issues within the framework of WTO trade policies is ―to open a new 
negotiation to conclude an environmental code that would set out minimum levels of 
pollution control and environmental quality with respect to certain key economic 
sectors such as import sensitive industries.‖38 Such a negotiation would allow 
developing countries to head off more expensive environmental restrictions by 
developing countries which may be allowable under the exceptions in Article XX. 
                                                 
37 Richard Devetak and Richard Higgott, ―Justice Unbound? Globalization, States and the Transformation of the 
Social Bond‖ International Affairs, Vol. 75, (July 1999): 493 
38 Thomas J. Schoenbaum ―Free International Trade and Protection of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?‖ 
(in Agora; Trade and Environment) The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 4. (Oct., 1992): 723 
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Whether such a negotiation is still feasible given the impasse between developed and 
developing countries in the Doha Round of trade negotiations is an open question.  
The fact remains though, that in the absence of any other world body, such as 
the oft suggested World Environment Organization, the only existing international 
institution within the framework of public international law that is in a position to 
mediate and adjudicate environmental issues and global trade disputes, is the WTO. 
While one may question the WTO‘s enforcement capabilities, their rulings still carry 
the force of law. Michael Weinstein and Steve Charnovitz suggest that;  
―The WTO must strike a balance between two extremes. 
Cracking down too hard on the use of environmental trade 
restrictions invites environmental damage. But excessive 
leniency in imposing sanctions invites two other abuses: pressure 
on poorer countries to adopt standards that are ill suited to their 
strained economies, and suppression of trade that will lead to 
higher prices and stunted growth.‖39  
 
Going forward, Weinstein and Charnovitz also have some suggestions for 
environmental NGOs in industrialised and developing countries; 
―Defer to multilateral environmental agreements.  
Invite legal briefs from outside experts.  
Mediate before litigating disputes.  
Monitor the environmental impacts of proposed trade 
agreements.  
Allow eco-labeling.  
Promote technology transfer and trade in environmental services. 
Curb environmentally damaging subsidies.‖40  
 
Environmental activists and citizens around the world are waiting for countries 
to pick up the ball and address the CO2 pollution which underlies the world‘s looming 
climate change crisis. Instead of regarding the WTO as an impediment in addressing 
these concerns, environmentalists should recognize that the WTO could actually help 
those countries and environmental NGOs who want to use the article XX exceptions. 
                                                 
39 Michael M.Weinstein and Steve Charnovitz. ―The Greening of the WTO‖ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80 No. 6 (2001): 
148 
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